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Abstract: This article intends to analyze Universal Child Allowance 
(UCA)—a large-scale conditional cash transfer (CCT) program in 
Argentina—from a human rights and constitutional perspective. Conditions 
required in the UCA system—which covers informal and unemployed 
workers—are compared to those established in family allowances, the 
contributory program created for registered workers. These differences in 
treatment are analyzed in connection with the right to equal treatment, taking 
into account applicable legal materials, including caselaw and theoretical 
contributions. After describing CCT programs in general and the specific 
features of UCA, and outlining Argentina’s constitutional and human rights 
framework, the article describes the specific conditions—maximum income, 
nationality, maximum number of covered children—applied only to 
informal and unregistered workers included in the UCA program. Compared 
to family allowances beneficiaries, workers under UCA have a much lower 
maximum wage limit to be eligible, and their children must fulfill nationality 
or legal residence requirements not applicable under the family allowances 
system. UCA covers only up to five children per family, while family 
allowances are paid to every child in formal workers’ families, with no 
restrictions. The article concludes that these planned differences in treatment 
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are not admissible under Argentina’s human rights obligations and 
constitutional setting. The article also advocates a human rights-based 
design for social policies, in order to ensure consistency with Argentina’s 
Constitution and international obligations. 
 
Keywords: Social Rights, Universal Child Allowance, Equality, Children’s 
Rights, Social Policy 
 
 
Resumen: Este artículo analiza la Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH)   
—un programa argentino a gran escala de transferencias monetarias 
condicionadas (TMC)— desde un punto de vista constitucional y de 
derechos humanos. Se comparan las condiciones en el sistema de la AUH 
—que cubre a trabajadores informales o desempleados— con aquéllas 
requeridas en el programa contributivo de Asignaciones Familiares (AF) 
para empleados registrados. Se analizan estas diferencias en relación con 
el derecho a la igualdad de trato, considerando jurisprudencia y 
contribuciones teóricas. Tras describir las TMC en general, las 
características de la AUH y el marco constitucional y de derechos humanos 
en Argentina, se analizan las condiciones específicas —máximo posible de 
ingreso, nacionalidad, número máximo de niños cubiertos— aplicadas a 
quienes perciben la AUH. En contraste con los beneficiarios de AF, los 
trabajadores abarcados por la AUH tienen un umbral mucho más bajo en 
cuanto al máximo sueldo admisible y sus hijos deben cumplir requisitos de 
nacionalidad o de residencia legal no exigidos en el caso de AF. La AUH 
cubre hasta cinco niños por familia, mientras que las AF se abonan a cada 
hijo de empleados formales, sin restricciones. El artículo concluye que estas 
diferencias planificadas de tratamiento no son admisibles frente a la 
Constitución argentina y a las obligaciones en materia de derechos 
humanos. El artículo también aboga por la adopción de un diseño de 
políticas sociales basado en derechos, a fin de asegurar la coherencia con 
la Constitución y las obligaciones internacionales de Argentina. 
 
Palabras clave: Derechos sociales, asignación universal por hijo, igualdad, 
derechos del niño, política social 
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In this article, I take a human rights prospective to analyze the design 
of the Universal Child Allowance (hereinafter “UCA”; Asignación 
Universal por Hijo, in Spanish), a large-scale noncontributory conditional 
cash transfers program in Argentina. First, I describe Conditional Cash 
Transfers (CCT) as an increasingly embraced policy option in Latin 
America. Then I characterize UCA and its differences with the 
corresponding contributory program, family allowances (Asignaciones 
Familiares, in Spanish). I analyze UCA design from a human rights and 
constitutional perspective to argue unjustified differences between children 
contradict the right to equal treatment and other relevant rights. Finally, I 
suggest human and constitutional rights should have a decisive role in 




II. CCT PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA 
In the final decades of the 20th century, poverty reduction became a 
significant item in the global policy agenda and “the poor” emerged as a 
defined group for policy purposes (Morais de Sá e Silva, 2017; Lavinas, 
2015). Debates arose about different approaches on poverty and its causes 
and effects, and on the most suitable strategies to improve the lives of the 
poor. Influential international institutions like the World Bank joined this 
effort. In 1989 then-President Lewis Preston insisted in taking poverty 
reduction as the Bank’s central concern. A two-part strategy can be found in 
the 1990 World Development Report, the Bank’s flagship publication. First, 
growth would be based in labor-intensive activities. Second, States should 
grant a comprehensive provision of basic health and education, while 
establishing appropriate safety nets. Social lending increased, as “market 
liberalization” programs remained the overriding policy framework 
(Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2007, p. 63; Kanbur & Vines, 2000, pp. 101-103), 
in spite of controversial results. After structural adjustment programs were 
put in practice, growth rates kept negative or extremely low. Health care, 
education and infrastructure investment diminished, while external debt 
continuously increased (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2007, pp. 3, 9-10, 25, 63). 
As early as in 1990, a World Bank technical publication admitted that, after 
nine years of adjustment policies, few clear signs of success could be seen 
(Ribe et al., 1990).  
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In the continuous search for instruments to reduce poverty, CCT 
programs appear to be a promising alternative. Access to welfare payments 
is subject to specific actions by those who receive the money, usually 
poverty-stricken families. Under these public programs, for example, they 
must ensure their children attend school and get vaccinations, among other 
health-related requirements. This set of conditions may improve their 
condition, by breaking «the intergenerational cycle of poverty» (Morais de 
Sá e Silva, 2017, p. 3; Rabinovich & Diepeveen, 2015). A World Bank’s 
technical publication defines these conditions as «prespecified investments 
in the human capital [of children]» (Fiszbein et al., 2009), in line with the 
previously described 1990s strategy.  
CCT programs have multiplied all over the world in the past few years: 
45 programs in 40 countries were in place in 2016. The World Bank 
pioneered this approach in 1994, by funding Bangladesh’s Female 
Secondary School Assistance Program (Morais de Sá e Silva, 2017, pp. 3, 
14-16). Statistical studies on Latin American countries that implement CCT 
programs show that poverty levels in those countries would have been 13% 
higher had the programs not been put in place (Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012, 
p. 11). CCT programs “seem to differentially favor disadvantaged groups” 
in Latin America, though they do not eliminate inequality of opportunity—
the impact of elements beyond individual control (Ham, 2014, p. 172). Since 
the early 2000s, economic growth in the region made more fiscal resources 
available for CCT programs (Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012, p. 12). Political 
feasibility, in turn, is another important concern: Fiszbein et al. (2009) 
highlight that inserting conditions makes it easier to gather political support 
for these programs. Transfers subject to certain requirements appear to be 
more acceptable for those social sectors who do not receive these payments 
(Skocpol, 1991). CCT programs seem to demand beneficiaries to “do 
something” in order to obtain the money. They are required to “earn” their 
access to social security. A former World Bank senior manager, however, 
has expressed his concern about the “rush” to create these programs, since 
they focus on the demand side while some countries face challenges on the 
provision of public services such as education and healthcare (Ravallion, 
2016, pp. 88-89). 
Generally speaking, these programs have a less-than-universal 
coverage (Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012), under a targeted-benefits scheme 
favored by the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD (Morissens, 2018, p. 
361; Ravallion, 2016, p. 88). However, these programs show various forms 
(Ceballos & Lautier, 2013). Some of them claim to be universal or, at least, 
almost universal, as I discuss in other sections. 
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Although different belief systems can offer compelling justifications 
for CCT, human capital theories appear to be a central foundation for these 
proposals (Morais de Sá e Silva, 2017, pp. 6, 171). CCT programs assume 
poverty is caused by a lack of human capital, in other words, insufficient 
education, or deficient healthcare, just to mention two examples. Cash 
transfers would be the key to build the lacking human capital. Using 
transfers as an incentive, these programs intend to modify families’ behavior 
and choices, leading them to engage in a rational cost-benefit analysis 
(Valencia Lomelí, 2008). There is no room, under such a policy, to discuss 
the fairness or unfairness of existing economic structures, where poverty 
grows. To reform such structures, if found unfair, would be a lot more 
difficult than setting up a CCT program. Such a system looks comfortably 
appealing in the eyes of policymakers. It can thrive without risking 
confrontations with powerful market forces, who remain untouched. 
Ceballos and Lautier (2013) argue that CCT programs offer a suitable way 
to depoliticize debates around poverty. Lo Vuolo (2012, p. 157), in turn, 
highlights that these schemes put in place “new contractual figures” between 
the State and selected individuals through the use of fiscal resources: several 
predefined activities appear as conditions (or “co-responsibilities”) to 
receive a certain amount of public money. Such a contractual design may 
discourage a collective, deeper, or more political approach to social issues 
of inclusion and distribution. Feminist critics, such as Pautassi (2017), 
highlight the absence of a gender focus in most CCT programs. 
Latin American countries have put in place various cash transfer 
programs, usually centered in children (Arza, 2018). Mexico’s Progresa, 
launched in 1997, is usually described as the first nation-wide program in 
the region. Renamed Oportunidades in 2002, it is known as Prospera since 
2014. Bolsa Família1 was established in Brazil with World Bank assistance 
(Morais de Sá e Silva, 2017, pp. 125-127). Under a different vision, Chile 
includes only “the most vulnerable groups” in its Ingreso Ético Familiar 
program (previously known as Chile Solidario), aimed at “overcoming 
extreme poverty”2. Direct participation of international financial institutions 
in these cash transfer systems in Latin America has been steadily increasing 
(Valencia Lomelí, 2008). 
These programs do not incorporate families into preexisting systems: 
expansion is achieved through the creation of separate benefits for poor, 
unregistered or unemployed workers, in a “segmented expansion” process. 
                                                 
1 See the official site, at: http://www.mds.gov.br/bolsafamilia (accessed August 8th, 2018).  
2 See the official site, at: http://www.ingresoetico.gob.cl/que-es-ief/ (accessed August 8th, 
2018).  
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A residual logic predominates—programs cover selected workers and 
families excluded from the official labor market. CCT programs are 
«income-tested, conditioned, and offer small amounts of cash» (Arza, 2018, 
pp. 60, 69). They target those who are poor or at risk of poverty or extreme 
deprivation; allowances are not intended to replace living wages but to 
prevent beneficiaries and their families from worsening their situation. 
Generally, these programs are not framed as rights or constitutional 
guarantees (Morais de Sá e Silva, 2017), but only as statutory benefits that 
can be modified through ordinary legislation, or even through Executive 
decrees. At the same time, noncompliance usually implies the loss or 
suspension of benefits. Lo Vuolo (2012, p. 160) describes these schemes as 
“punitive” since they include sanctions against beneficiaries who fail to 
abide by required conditions.  
  
 
III. UCA: A CCT PROGRAM IN ARGENTINA  
Argentina’s UCA is one of these non-contributory CCT programs. It 
grants allowances to children of unemployed and informal workers, as long 
as families comply with certain conditionalities: children must attend school 
and go through regular health check-ups. UCA is officially presented as an 
expansion of the family allowances system established in 1957 for registered 
workers. 
Through Necessity and Urgency Decree3 1602/2009, President 
Cristina Fernández created the UCA in October 2009. The UCA is a monthly 
cash payment to one of the parents (mothers have priority) for each child 
under 18 years old, up to a maximum of 5 children per family. Payments are 
subject to compliance of healthcare and school attendance conditions. 80% 
of the monthly benefit is regularly paid to the designated parent; the 
remaining 20% can be collected at the end of the year after handing in 
certificates to prove conditionalities were met. Eligible parents must be 
unemployed, or must be unregistered workers earning less than the official 
minimum wage (Arza, 2018; Bertranou and Maurizio, 2012; Arcidiácono, 
2016; Pribble, 2013). UCA now covers almost 4 million children; Brazil’s 
Bolsa Familia includes 12.7 million households, while Chile’s CCT 
program covers 1.3 million children (Arza, 2018, p. 63). As of June 2018, 
                                                 
3 According to art. 99.3 of Argentina’s Constitution, this kind of Decrees have the same 
effect and rank as a statute passed by Congress. Necessity and Urgency Decrees can be 
issued by the President «[o]nly when due to exceptional circumstances the ordinary 
procedures foreseen by this Constitution for the enactment of laws are impossible to be 
followed». 
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the monthly payment amounts to AR$ (Argentinian pesos) 1,5784 
(approximately 56 US dollars, at the current official exchange rate). As in 
other countries, the World Bank contributed to consolidate UCA through a 
480 million US dollars loan in 2011 (cfr. World Bank, 2011b), a complement 
of a previous 2009 loan aimed at improving social protection systems. The 
Bank considers UCA as an important step in the process of closing previous 
social protection schemes, centered in the Heads of Households program, 
which was an emergency response to the 2001 crisis (World Bank, 2011).  
UCA, as a non-contributory cash transfer system, appears to be an 
extension of the pre-existing contributory family allowances scheme. 
Family allowances are paid only to registered workers whose combined 
family income is less than AR$ 83,917 (around 3,000 US dollars at August 
2018 official exchange rate)5. Registered employees whose combined 
family income is more than AR$ 24,491 (approximately 875 US dollars) and 
less than AR$ 83,917 receive a reduced amount of family allowances. In 
2016, self-employed registered workers at the lowest income bracket were 
included in the family allowances system (cfr. Presidential Decree 
593/2016). Almost 5 million children are currently covered by family 
allowances (Arza, 2018). 
UCA amount is equal to the highest family allowances value (in other 
words, the one paid to registered workers whose combined family income is 
below AR$ 24,492). Family allowances and UCA figures are regularly 
adjusted through the pension index6. This underscores a sense of equality 
between the two separate systems, both funded by the social security budget. 
ANSES, the national social security agency (Spanish: Administración 
Nacional de la Seguridad Social), administers both benefits. Access to both 
systems is automatic.  
In spite of all the similarities between family allowances and UCA, 
both programs differ. As I show below, conditions, payment schedule, and 
entry requirements to receive the allowance are not the same for registered 
and unregistered workers. These differences deserve a specific, rights-based 
scrutiny. In the next section, I offer such an analysis. 
                                                 
4 Data available at the official site: http://www.anses.gob.ar/informacion/montos-de-
asignacion-universal-por-hijo-y-por-embarazo-para-proteccion-social/ (accessed August 
8th, 2018).  
5 Figures established by Decree 702/2018. These figures are regularly modified by 
Presidential Decree, according to average wage increases. Families are also excluded from 
the family allowances system if one of its members earns more than AR$ 41,959 
(approximately 1,500 US dollars) regardless of the combined income.  
6 See Law 27.160, approved in July 2015. Pension index was reformed by Law 27.426 in 
December 2017.  
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IV. ASSESING UCA FROM A NEW PERSPECTIVE: HUMAN 
RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS  
Adoption of UCA in Argentina spurred a series of studies to assess its 
effects on poverty reduction, school attendance, and other social relevant 
issues. Available sociological research shows positive effects, such as the 
reduction of indigence levels among children (Bertranou and Maurizio, 
2012) or the growing rate of schooling in families that receive these 
payments. A group of public universities carried on an early appraisal on 
how UCA impacted on education (Ministerio de Educación, 2011). A later 
study, based on official data, concluded that the program does not have 
«significant effect on either drop out or grade advancement for the 
population as a whole», but «a small negative effect on drop out and a 
positive effect on grade advancement» could be detected in the poorest areas 
of the country (Pierri & Assad, 2014, p. 10). More recently, Edo and 
Marchionni (2018) describe positive effects of UCA in intra-year drop out 
rates and primary education completion rates, with an even greater impact 
on girls aged 12-17, while less encouraging results on the same subject can 
be found in D’Elía & Navarro (2013). Garganta et al. (2016) found that UCA 
may be related to a 2% increase of fertility rates in potential beneficiaries, 
though the program has not demographic objectives—at least explicitly. All 
of these studies focus on efficacy of UCA as an instrument.  
Here I propose a different analysis. I examine UCA from a human 
rights and constitutional rights perspective. Beyond the alleged positive 
effects of the UCA program or its social legitimacy, fiscal sustainability, or 
political feasibility, is it consistent with human and constitutional rights 
granted by Argentinian law?  
 
 
V. HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
In Argentina’s legal system, human rights questions are also 
constitutional questions. Most of central human rights international 
covenants have constitutional rank. Any clause included in these covenants 
have the highest legal value as domestic law. In 1994, a broad constitutional 
reform extended the range of human rights through two mechanisms. First, 
the reform added some rights and guarantees in the Constitution’s text, such 
as consumers’ rights (Argentinian Constitution, art. 42), or the right to a 
healthy environment (art. 41). Another clause orders Congress to keep the 
entire public education system tuition-free (art. 75.19).  
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A second, innovative mechanism was used. The 1994 Convention 
endowed nine human rights treaties with constitutional rank7 (Koven Levit, 
1999), in addition to Argentina’s commitment at the international level. The 
language from international human rights law has to be harmonized with the 
rest of the Constitution since all these elements share an equal rank (Gelli, 
2005, p. 716; Morgan-Foster, 2003, pp. 591-594; Lo Prete, 2009, pp. 680-
682). The Constitution and the relevant international human rights treaties 
form what Argentinian law scholars label as «(federal) constitutional block» 
(Bidart Campos, 2000), a defined set of legal instruments endowed with the 
highest domestic rank. 
The list of social rights has greatly expanded as a result of the 1994 
reform. The most relevant treaty in this area, of course, is the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), monitored 
by the Geneva-based UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR). The Covenant becomes even more relevant after 2013, 
when its Optional Protocol came into effect. Under this Protocol, individual 
claims may be filed before the CESCR against Argentina, as a State party to 
both the Covenant and its Optional Protocol8.  
On the other hand, if any governmental action or omission contradicts 
these human rights treaties, it is also unconstitutional. Not only international 
accountability is at stake: actions or omissions can be challenged before 
domestic courts. Art. 43 of Argentina’s Constitution institutes a quick relief 
action, the amparo action (Rivera-Pérez, 2012, pp. 198-203; Jiménez, 2015; 
Sagüés, 1999, v. 1, pp. 301-310). Any person can file a petition against any 
violation of her or his rights; courts can subject any involved statute to 
constitutional review (Hernández, 2010, pp. 910-911) and, as a result, strike 
it down and make it inapplicable to the case9. Constitutional-rank social 
                                                 
7 Argentinian Constitution, art. 75.22. The same provision includes a Congressional 
procedure for the removal of these treaties from the constitutional framework, and for the 
incorporation of new human rights treaties. Both operations require supermajority votes in 
both houses of Congress. 
8 Argentina ratified the Optional Protocol in 2011; see Law 26.663. 
9 See Argentinian Constitution, art. 43 that provides that:  
 
«[a]ny person shall file a prompt and summary proceeding regarding constitutional 
guarantees, provided there is no other legal remedy, against any act or omission of 
the public authorities or individuals which currently or imminently may damage, 
limit, modify or threaten rights and guarantees recognized by this Constitution, 
treaties or laws, with open arbitrariness or illegality. In such case, the judge may 
declare that the act or omission is based on an unconstitutional rule». 
For a general review of amparo actions in Latin America, see Brewer-Carías, 2007, and 
Orrego Hoyos, 2013. 
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rights in Argentina also include those espoused in art. 14 bis, a 60-year-old 
clause. This three-paragraph article, adopted through the 1957 constitutional 
reform, enumerates workers’ rights, union rights and social security 
guarantees10.  
Inconsistency between social rights and social policies open the way 
for individual and collective claims before domestic and international fora. 
UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights (2012) has 
explicitly affirmed that eradication of extreme poverty is a legal obligation 
under international human rights law—not only a moral duty. Poverty 
implies deprivation of human rights (CESCR, 2001), turning a social ill into 
a constitutional question. In the following sections, I intend to make a human 
rights (and constitutional) assessment of certain aspects of UCA as a legal 
scheme. I do not focus on its effects but on its design features. In particular, 
I turn to the conditions required to children for accessing the right to social 
security, in order to define if such conditions are consistent with Argentina’s 
constitutional and human rights framework.  
 
 
VI. CONDITIONED RIGHTS 
CCT programs require people to fulfill a certain set of conditions to 
enjoy a right. The UCA program regulates access to childen’s constitutional 
right to social security, granted in art. 26 of the CRC, art. 9 of the ICESCR 
and also in art. 14 bis of Argentina’s Constitution11. 
Such a scheme brings to mind more general questions. Can States 
require specific actions from a person in order to fulfill their own human 
rights obligations? Should any right be subject to conditions? Nothing in the 
covenants seems to favor conditioned access to human rights. To the 
contrary, every right is granted to “everyone”, with no references to any 
condition. Some specific qualifications appear in a few articles. For 
example, art. 13 of the ICESCR recognizes the right to higher education 
including a reference to “capacity”, which may be construed as a condition 
to access. In Argentina, another constitutional-rank instrument, the 1948 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, includes both rights 
and obligations (Gelli, 2005, p. 400). Yet these duties are not conditions to 
enjoy rights. Even under this American Declaration, a person does not have 
                                                 
10 Art. 14 bis grants the workers’ right to «protection against arbitrary dismissal», «equal 
pay for equal work», «participation in the profits of enterprises, with control of production 
and collaboration in the management», and the unions’ right to strike. 
11 See Argentinian Constitution, art. 14 bis (establishing that «[t]he State shall grant the 
benefits of social security, which shall be of an integral nature and may not be waived»).  
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to fulfill his or her duties in order to exercise any of the rights included in 
the text. For instance, the State cannot require a person to ensure her elderly 
parents have proper assistance (art. 30) as a condition to enjoy freedom of 
religion (art. 3). A full answer to the question of conditioned rights is beyond 
the scope of this article. My analysis, as can be seen below, does not discuss 
the inclusion of conditions per se. These are taken as a given feature of CCT 
programs.  
The UCA program requires certain actions to parents. They have to 
show evidence that children have been subject to medical checkups and 
mandatory vaccinations (Straschnoy, 2016, p. 184). Parents also have to 
provide school certificates to prove completion of the appropriate academic 
courses. All of these actions require families to directly and regularly 
interact with health and educational bureaucracies (Ambort and Straschnoy, 
2018), who become empowered to scrutinize who “deserves” benefits 
(Arcidiácono, 2017, p. 36). Failure to produce required documents leads to 
cancellation of benefits12. For instance, as of February 2016, more than 
500,000 children had their benefit suspended (World Bank, 2016, p. 5). 
Apparently, these requirements aim to ensure cash transfers are properly used 
to procure health care and education for every child included in the program.  
Is this the only way to ensure this objective? Or are there any less 
restrictive, more reasonable alternatives? This is a constitutional question. 
Argentina’s Constitution, in its art. 28, adopts “reasonableness” as the 
guiding principle in regulations on rights13. In a well-settled interpretation 
by Argentina’s Supreme Court, “reasonable” regulations must bear a 
proportional relationship to legitimate objectives (Bidart Campos, 1991, p. 
407; Sagüés, 1999, v. 2, pp. 880-889). They have to be proportionate means, 
clearly related to the pursued objectives14. There must be a causal connection 
between the regulation and the desired effect (Gelli, 2005, p. 331).  
UCA conditions are part of the regulations applied to the right to social 
security. Are they proportional to the likely objectives, namely, to make sure 
health care and education are timely provided to children? If a less restrictive 
alternative can be devised to achieve the same objective, then UCA 
regulations are unreasonable, disproportionate, and, for that very reason, 
unconstitutional. Canceling benefits to children whose parents fail to 
provide the required certificates appears to be an unreasonable response. 
                                                 
12 See Law 24.714, art. 18.k. 
13 Argentinian Constitution, art. 28, reads: “The principles, guarantees and rights recognized 
in the preceding sections shall not be modified by the laws that regulate their enforcement”. 
14 This concept of “reasonableness” was first articulated in “Inchauspe” (1944); see Miller, 
1997a, p. 148. For a more recent application of this principle, see “Irízar” (1996), majority 
vote, parag. 8.  
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There are less restrictive alternatives. For instance, a close relative could be 
appointed in lieu of parents to collect the transfers and to produce the 
required certificates. This would separate children from the consequences of 
their parents’ inability to fulfill the UCA conditions.  
To sum up, a first constitutional question comes to the surface. Benefit 
cancellation imposes—on its face—a disproportionate burden on children’s 
right to social security. Less restrictive, more gradual alternatives are 
conceivable in order to achieve the same objective, namely, making sure 
certain actions are performed to improve a child’s welfare. Unreasonable 
regulations can be challenged on constitutional grounds.  
 
  
VII. A QUESTION OF EQUALITY 
Now I turn to a different set of questions. The principles at stake here 
are not only reasonableness but also equality and nondiscrimination. 
The right to equal treatment and the principle of “real equality” 
[igualdad real] can be found in arts. 16 and 75.23 of Argentina’s 
Constitution15 (Gelli, 2005, pp. 181-204). The ICESCR, in turn, establishes 
that «the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without 
discrimination of any kind» (art. 2.2). Similar language is included in arts. 1 
and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in art. 1 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, all of them endowed with 
constitutional rank.  
From this perspective, some inequalities become apparent and deserve 
scrutiny. Conditions established for UCA beneficiaries are different from 
the ones in the family allowances system. In the following paragraphs, I 
analyze the differences in required conditions. 
 
VII.1. Maximum income 
As explained before, registered workers are entitled to family 
allowances if their combined family income is less than 3,000 US dollars (at 
August 2018 official exchange rate). Not all of them receive the same 
amount. Workers are classified in different income tiers: higher income 
implies lower family allowances. The first tier includes workers whose 
combined family income is below 875 US dollars. This tier receives the 
highest family allowances—which equals the UCA, as previously described.  
                                                 
15 Argentinian Constitution, art. 16, establishes that all inhabitants are «equal before the 
law”, and that equality “is the basis of taxation and public burdens». After 1994, art. 75.23 
enables Congress «to legislate and to promote positive measures guaranteeing true equal 
opportunities and treatment». 
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Here is the first difference in treatment: in order to be eligible for 
UCA, informal workers have to earn less than the minimum wage16, set in 
AR$ 10,700 (roughly 380 US dollars)17. In other words, upper limits are 
different for registered and unregistered employees. An unregistered worker 
with a wage between 380 and 875 US dollars is excluded from the UCA 
system. Yet a registered employee with the same wage has a right to receive 
full family allowances for his or her children. 
This difference in treatment appears to be unjustified. Informality is 
taken as a reason to exclude workers from a social right. Yet lack of 
registration should not harm the workers since their own labor rights are 
being affected (for instance, the rights granted in ICESCR, arts. 6 and 7). 
Quite to the contrary, sanctions should be imposed on employers who skip 
legal obligations in labor relationships. 
Children of some registered workers (those included in the lowest-
income tier) receive a benefit which is denied to children whose parents are 
informal workers with the same income. This difference contradicts the right 
to equal treatment. It needs to be justified with precise arguments to prove it 
reasonable, that is, proportional to a specific and legitimate governmental 
objective. A possible objective under a CCT program would be to reduce 
“leakage”, the percentage of beneficiaries who are not poor (Stampini & 
Tornarolli, 2012; Ravallion, 2016). It would be difficult to accept such an 
argument because both groups of workers have the same income—they only 
differ in formality. Yet at the same time, the Government would have to 
prove less restrictive alternatives are not available. In any event, nothing in 
the creation Decree offers an explanation that could be reviewed in light of 
the reasonableness principle.  
  
VII.2. Nationality 
Registered workers receive family allowances for every child under 
18 years old who is single and lives in Argentina. The UCA system, by 
contrast, includes an additional requirement: the child must be Argentinian. 
To be eligible, foreign-born children must have been legal residents at least 
for the past 3 years18. Again, UCA beneficiaries are subject to a different set of 
conditions, not established for formal employees. Informality becomes the 
source of an unequal treatment-namely, a more restrictive access threshold.  
                                                 
16 See Decree 1602/2009, art. 2. 
17 This figure is in force since September 1st, 2018 through November 30th, 2018. See 
Resolution 3/2018 of the National Council on Employment, Productivity and the Minimum 
Wage (Spanish: Consejo Nacional del Empleo, la Productividad y el Salario Mínimo, Vital 
y Móvil), issued on August 8th, 2018. 
18 See Decree 1602/2009, art. 6. 
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Nationality-related conditions raise specific constitutional questions. 
Argentina’s Constitution explicitly grants equal civil rights for foreigners. 
As part of an immigration-based project (Miller, 1997, p. 1503), the 1853 
Constitution included special provisions to benefit people from other 
countries who settle in Argentina (Hines, 2010, p. 476). First, as a general 
rule, constitutional rights are granted to “inhabitants”, not only citizens, 
according to art. 14 of Argentinian Constitution (Bidart Campos, 2000, pp. 
754, 762, 770; Sagüés, 1999, v. 2, pp. 302-304; Gelli. 2005, p. 75). Art. 20, 
in particular, establishes: «Foreigners enjoy within the territory of the Nation 
all the civil rights of citizens (...)». Argentina’s Supreme Court has adopted 
in the past few decades a strict scrutiny standard for reviewing statutes that 
appear to discriminate against foreigners19.  
Only reasonable regulations would be admissible under art. 28. Once 
again, the UCA creation decree does not include arguments to support this 
distinction between Argentinian and non-Argentinian children. There is no 
mention of governmental objectives that could be used to evaluate the 
proportionality of this distinction in order to assess its reasonableness.  
A possible argument could be found in the ICESCR itself. Its art. 2.3 
includes a special provision: «Developing countries, with due regard to 
human rights and their national economy, may determine to what extent they 
would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to 
non-nationals» (emphasis added). For the sake of the argument, I will 
consider here that cash transfer programs could be included among 
“economic rights”, in spite of being part of the social security system 
(arguably related to a “social right”). Yet even in that case the clause cannot 
justify, under Argentinian law, the nationality-based distinction in the UCA 
program. First, art. 14 bis grants social security benefits without any 
reference to citizenship or national origin as eligibility criteria. In addition 
to that, the CRC, also endowed with constitutional rank, not only grants 
children the right to social security (art. 26), but it also prohibits any 
discrimination based on national origin (art. 2). Taking Argentina’s domestic 
constitutional law as a set of instruments of the same rank (the so-called 
“constitutional block”), under lex specialis principle specific clauses prevail 
over more general ones (Barbosa Pinto, 2003, p. 178). The specific clause 
on social security (art. 14 bis) and the group-specific treaty (CRC) prevail 
over the more general clause included in the ICESCR.  
                                                 
19 See, for instance, “Repetto” (1986) (holding unconstitutional a resolution that required 
Argentinian nationality to be a teacher at private schools) and “Calvo y Pessini” (1998) 
(striking down the same nationality requirement to be part of a public hospital staff). See 
also Hines, 2010, pp. 477-478. 
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Under international law, the nationality condition becomes even less 
justifiable. The ICESCR establishes an important rule:  
 
«No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights 
recognized or existing in any country in virtue of law, conventions, regulations or 
custom shall be admitted on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize 
such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent» (art. 5.2). 
 
From an international law perspective, the Covenant and the 
Constitution are not part of a single “block” (as Argentinian legal scholars 
describe it from a local standpoint), but separate instruments from different 
legal orders. When domestic law (for instance, the Constitution) has a more 
inclusive formulation of a certain right, this internal provision must prevail 
according to art. 5.2 of the ICESCR. In art. 20, Argentinian Constitution sets 
up a full-equality principle for foreigners. The exception included in art. 2.3 
of the Covenant must yield.  
The CESCR has criticized the UCA regulation on foreign-born 
children. In its 2011 Concluding Observations on Argentina, the Committee 
expressed its concern «that requirements to receive the universal allowance 
for children, which is granted by law, in practice exclude certain groups such 
as migrants and their children from receiving this benefit». Alternative 
reports by civil society organizations had also raised the question. The 
Committee calls upon Argentina «to consider adopting all the necessary 
measures to ensure the unrestricted coverage of the universal allowance for 
children» (CESCR, 2011, p. 6). The Committee is the Covenant’s 
monitoring body of experts. Its opinion bears also high domestic relevance. 
Argentina’s Supreme Court has defined the Committee as an “authoritative 
interpreter” of the Covenant20. According to a widely supported opinion 
among Argentina’s constitutional scholars, comments and conclusions from 
international monitoring bodies should inform the local interpretation of 
treaties (Gelli, 2005, pp. 712-713; Sagüés, 1999, v. 2, pp. 279-280; Quiroga 
Lavié, 2000, p. 483). In September 2018, Argentina’s periodic report on 
ICESCR implementation will be reviewed by the Committee, leading to a 
new Concluding Observation.  
 
VII.3. Required documents 
I have briefly described what documents UCA beneficiaries must 
produce in order to remain included in the system: medical and school 
certificates21. On the other hand, registered workers are not required to 
                                                 
20 See “Q. C.” (2012), majority vote, parag. 10. 
21 See Decree 1602/2009, art. 6. 
Horacio Javier Etchichury 
 
 | v. 7 (2018), p. 214 
provide these documents as a condition to receive family allowances. Once 
again, different treatment is established only because of labor informality, 
which is not the worker’s choice, but the employer’s. 
This different set of conditions also implies a stigma. It expresses an 
unjustified assumption, namely, that unregistered workers are less likely to 
take their children to school, or to the hospital to get medical care or 
mandatory vaccines. Such an assumption would be the only logical reason 
to require certificates only to informal employees. In her research, 
Straschnoy (2016, p. 188) reports public authorities often describe 
conditionalities as instruments to “correct” parental behavior. According to 
UCA regulation, only informal workers need to be corrected. 
The right to equal treatment before the law precludes the State from 
unduly describing and treating a class of people (unregistered workers, in 
this case) as less worthy of consideration, or less trustworthy. The legal 
imposition of specific conditions amounts to a public expression of the 
State’s undue assumption. The UCA decree does not justify it: no empirical 
or other evidence is offered. Consequently, unjustified differences in 
treatment amount to discrimination, due to lack of reasonableness. The 
condition may be subject to constitutional challenge. 
 
VII.4. Number of included children 
Under the UCA system parents receive an allowance for each child up 
to a maximum of five children22. There is no allowance for any additional 
child. On the other hand, registered workers get an allowance for every 
child: the family allowances system does not include a ceiling in the number 
of covered children. If a registered employee has 6 children, he or she gets 
6 allowances (approximately 336 US dollars). An informal worker in the 
same situation gets only 5 allowances (280 US dollars). This is a concrete 
difference in treatment: 20% less money. It requires a thorough explanation 
in order to be reasonable, and for that reason, constitutionally admissible. 
Different treatment also becomes apparent among the unregistered worker’s 
children: the first five children receive an allowance that is denied to the 
sixth child, the seventh child, and so on. 
I sum up the constitutional question as follows. The system treats 
differently two groups: registered workers and informal workers (and 
families from both groups). The latter group has a much lower maximum 
wage limit to be eligible. Children from this group must fulfill specific 
nationality or legal residence conditions. Unregistered workers have to 
                                                 
22 See Decree 1602/2009, art. 5.  
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produce certificates, while formal workers are not required to do so. Finally, 
there is a maximum of five children per family that can be covered by the 
UCA program, while family allowances are delivered to every child in a 
family with no limits. All of these differences do not arise from practice: 
they are thoroughly worded in the UCA legal framework. Every element has 
been planned and included. It is too early to know if these differences will 
definitely evolve into a two-track social security system, reinforcing the 
worst traditions of Latin American social segmentation (Valencia Lomelí, 
2008, p. 491). 
All of these differences can surely be described as a set of regulations 
on the access to the right to social security. As explained before, the State 
has to justify them, explaining how these regulations serve a legitimate 
governmental purpose, with no disproportionate burdens on workers’ and 
children’s rights. In other words, the State must show how these differences 
are “reasonable” under art. 28 of Argentina’s Constitution. Yet no suitable 
explanation is offered in the UCA creation decree: this silence makes it 
difficult to consider all the system’s conditions as a reasonable set of 
regulations.  
A probable, though not explicit, reason for the exisiting regulation is 
fiscal sustainability. Yet it does not justify disregard for constitutional 
clauses. In a 2012 landmark decision on the right to housing, Argentina’s 
Supreme Court made clear that resource scarcity per se does not exempt the 
State from its obligations23. This position follows the lines defined by the 
CESCR in its analysis of art. 2.1 of the ICESCR. In General Comment 
number 3, the Committee makes clear that «even where the available 
resources are demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains for a State 
party to strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights 
under the prevailing circumstances» (CESCR, 1990). n other words, the 
Covenant’s reference to the availability of resources does not give State 
parties unrestricted discretionary powers to define to what extent social 
rights will be honored. Such an interpretation would violate the pacta sunt 
servanda principle24: States would be signing a Covenant which includes a 
clause that makes the rest of the Covenant non-binding (Craven, 1995, p. 
136). In any event, the UCA creation decree does not include any reference 
                                                 
23 See “Q. C.” (2012), majority vote, parag. 14; see also Justice Petracchi’s concurring 
opinion, parag. 17. 
24 In public international law, it means that States must respect their obligations established 
by treaty. It is a widely recognized and accepted principle in international law, included in 
art. 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “Every treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Argentina 
ratified the Vienna Convention on December 5th, 1972. 
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to the availability of resources, nor any other justification based on fiscal 
considerations.  
According to Arcidiácono (2017), the inequalities described above 
may be “recodified” as “conditioned rights”—while “genuine rights” would 
only belong to the contributory system. A new administration took office in 
December 2015. President Mauricio Macri, a multimillionaire engineer 
backed by a right-of-center coalition supportive of pro-investment policies 
(Casullo, 2016; Lansberg Rodríguez, 2016; Vommaro, 2017), has not 
improved the UCA regulation. He has even promoted a regressive measure: 
Congress approved his proposal to change the applicable adjustment index25.  
An additional observation: all these differences in treatment were 
present in the 2011 World Bank loan documents that assessed UCA as a 
social policy. The institution was completely aware of the unequal treatment 
established in the system. This is hardly a surprise since the Bank does not 
evaluate its projects according to human rights standards (Darrow, 2003, pp. 
19, 51; Sarfaty, 2009; Ghazi, 2005), such as the right to social security or 
the equality or non-discrimination principles. The Bank argues human rights 
are beyond its mission and describes itself as a technical institution with a 
non-political mandate. Moreover, it does not consider itself bound by 
international human rights instruments (Ghazi, 2005, pp. 82-83), and does 
not take into account human rights obligations of borrower countries in 
assessing or designing policy proposals (Sarfaty, 2009, pp. 647-648).  
This highlights the need to rethink the way social policies are designed 
at the domestic level. A traditional approach identifies existing problems and 
available resources, in order to devise solutions and proposals based on 
efficacy, political feasibility, and fiscal sustainability considerations. In this 
designing process, human rights and other constitutional rights are not 
included as decisive criteria. 
Yet a democratic, constitutional State should not follow this pattern. 
Social problems, at least to some extent, are also violations of human and 
constitutional rights (social rights, in this case). Hunger, malnutrition, 
homelessness, illiteracy, exploitation, and unemployment are not only 
troubling social situations but also constitutional questions. Any proposal to 
deal with them must also be consistent with the Constitution.  
Policy design should start by identifying the rights at stake—health, 
education, housing—in order to set the goals and select the instruments to 
achieve their full realization, or their progressive realization, according to 
art. 2.1 of the ICESCR. Authorities must make sure every step is consistent 
with applicable constitutional principles and rights. That is efficacy from a 
                                                 
25 See Law 27.426. 
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human rights perspective. The “maximum of available resources” (as 
required by art. 2.1), with due consideration to all rights granted by the State, 
should be committed to this task: that is fiscal sustainability in this context. 
Finally, the State should communicate what are its obligations under the 
ICESCR, offering facts and information to inform and expand a free public 
debate and an open social dialogue on the policy: that is how political 
feasibility can be achieved. These are just very general lines on how policy 
design follows a different path when rights are taken as mandatory guiding 
lines. This approach makes it more likely that policies will survive any 
constitutional scrutiny under judicial review.  
 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 
1. After 1994 reform, Argentina’s constitutional commitment to 
human rights requires State organs to base their actions and policies on those 
rights. The rest of constitutional rights are part of the same fundamental 
framework that defines the limits of policymaking.  
2. Social policies, just like any other policy, can be subject to 
constitutional review. Under that light, the UCA system gives unregistered 
workers unequal treatment. Only children from this group must fulfill 
specific nationality or legal residence requirements. Informal workers, in 
turn, must produce school and medical certificates to receive UCA, while 
formal workers under family allowances program are not required to do so. 
Compared to family allowances beneficiaries, informal workers have a 
much lower maximum wage limit to be eligible. In addition to that, UCA 
system covers only up to five children per family, while family allowances 
are paid to every child in registered workers’ families, without restrictions. 
3. The creation Decree offers no explicit justification that could turn 
those differences into a reasonable regulation. From a constitutional 
perspective, unjustified different treatment to UCA-covered families makes 
judicial challenges possible. Any family with more than five children may 
file an amparo action to require additional allowances invoking the right to 
equal treatment. The same argument would be useful for parents of foreign-
born children to demand their inclusion in the UCA program. Equality also 
appears to be a relevant argument for unregistered workers earning more 
than the minimum wage. If local courts fail to provide relief, international 
monitoring mechanisms lay ahead. Planned, unjustified differences have no 
place in Argentina’s constitutional framework.  
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